


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
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**ATTITUDES OF YOUTH
TOWARD MILITARY SERVICE
IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE:**

**Results From National Surveys
Conducted Between May 1971
and November 1973**

by

John R. Goral

and

Andres Lipowitz

Prepared for the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

CONSULTING REPORT
CR-ED-74-1

July 1974

Surveys conducted by

Gilbert Youth Research, Inc.
515 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Report prepared by

Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO)
300 North Washington Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
6	AD A094084	9
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE ATTITUDES OF YOUTH TOWARD MILITARY SERVICE IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE: RESULTS FROM NATIONAL SURVEYS CONDUCTED BETWEEN MAY 1971 AND NOVEMBER 1973		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Consulting Report
7. AUTHOR(s)		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
10 John R. Goral and Andrea Lipowitz		CR-ED-74-1
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) 300 North Washington Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
		15 F41609-73-C-0030
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
		12. REPORT DATE July 1974
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 56
14 HUMRRO-CR-ED-74-1		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Research performed under HumRRO Work Unit DAD.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) enlistment All-Volunteer Force enlistment incentives enlistment deterrents Service images recruiting		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This report presents information, gathered from national samples representative of the population of American male youth 16 to 21 years old, on a variety of topics related to the transition from a draft-reliant to an all-voluntary military force. Data were obtained by means of six interview surveys conducted at 6-month intervals, beginning in May 1971 and concluding in November 1973. Results pertaining to the following areas of concern are contained in the report: enlistment intent; incentives to enlistment; deterrents to enlistment; knowledge about military service; Service images; and recruiting.		

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents information, gathered from national samples representative of the population of American male youth 16 to 21 years old, on a variety of topics related to the transition from a draft-reliant to an all-volunteer military force. Data were obtained by means of six interview surveys conducted at six-month intervals beginning in May 1971.

Each of the surveys was conducted by Gilbert Youth Research, Inc., which also provided preliminary data tabulations. Additional tabulations, data analyses, and preparation of reports were accomplished by the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) for the Directorate for Manpower Research in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

Results pertaining to the following areas of concern are contained in the present report.

Enlistment Intent

In November 1973, 12% of those questioned indicated that they would definitely or probably enlist in the active service as a Regular. Corresponding percentages in earlier surveys asking about enlistment intent under a "no-draft" condition ranged from 11% to 15%. In each survey the majority of youth indicating positive enlistment intent stated that they did not expect to enlist in the next 12 months (72% in November 1973).

Highest rates of positive enlistment intent in the November 1973 survey occurred among high school underclassmen (22%), high school dropouts (19%), and high school seniors not continuing their education (18%). Lower percentages were reported by high school graduates not in school (11%), high school seniors planning on continuing their education (10%), college students (5%), and those not in school with more than a high school education (5%). In general these results are consistent with previous findings.

Similar racial differences in enlistment intent have been found in each survey, with a somewhat higher percentage of non-whites indicating a chance of joining the military than whites (15% compared to 12% in November 1973).

Intent to join the Reserves or National Guard was expressed by 13% in November 1973. Earlier surveys had reported between 9% and 12% on the same question. Racial and educational subgroup differences in intent to join the Reserves or National Guard were similar to those indicated for the Regular Force. In November 1973 there was considerable overlap (4%) in the responses dealing with intended enlistment in the Regular and Reserve or National Guard components, indicating that caution should be used in projecting accession levels from these data.

In November 1973, 9% of the college juniors and seniors indicated a willingness to volunteer for active duty as an officer. Highest officer enlistment potential was observed in November 1971 (13%).

Incentives to Enlistment

In November 1973, among those expecting to enter Active Service, the major appeals of the military were found to be "learning a trade or skill valuable in civilian life" (60%) and "travel, excitement, and new experiences" (56%).

The most popular potential incentives to enlistment continued to be: "a fully paid college education" (18%), "\$200 per month for up to four years of college" (13%), and "assistance in obtaining a civilian job including training if necessary" (10%).

The most popular incentives to a combat assignment enlistment in November 1973, as well as in previous surveys, were: "a shorter enlistment period" (7%), "guaranteed assignments in one's military specialty" (7%), and "four years of college in return for four years of service" (7%).

The reasons for joining the Reserves or National Guard most often cited in November 1973 by those expecting to join were: "training in skills usable in civilian life" (41%), "educational benefits" (30%), and "supplemental income" (25%).

"Educational benefits" was the proposed Reserve/National Guard incentive most often selected in each survey (21% in November 1973) from among seven other choices. In November 1973, 23% indicated they would definitely or probably join the Reserves or National Guard if an \$1100 cash bonus were offered while 35% responded positively to a \$2200 critical skill bonus.

Deterrents to Enlistment

Concerning conditions perceived to exist in the military that would deter enlistment, the three most often mentioned in November 1973 were: "extended time away from home" (52%), "strict discipline and training conditions" (51%), and "the high risk of injury" (47%). These deterrents have been the three most often mentioned in all of the Gilbert surveys, with the "high risk of injury" ranking first in all but the 1973 surveys.

Fifty-four percent of the respondents in November 1973 indicated that there were personal considerations deterring them from military service. This represented a continuation of a declining trend observed following the initial May 1971 administration which found 65% of youth with personal considerations blocking their enlistment. The major factors affecting these individuals have been a belief that they could not live their preferred life style (34% in November 1973), an unwillingness to relinquish their freedom (30% in November 1973), and an opposition to war or the military (20% in November 1973).

The three reasons consistently found to most often deter Reserve and National Guard affiliation have been: "insufficient pay" (34% in November 1973), "conflict with civilian job" (33% in November 1973), and "a general dislike of the military" (32% in November 1973).

Knowledge About Military Service

Respondents were asked in an open-ended format what they knew about various aspects of the military. Among types of answers regarding vocational training in each survey, the two most often mentioned were favorable comments dealing with the quality of training (16% in November 1973), and the range of opportunities (14% in November 1973). Responses pertaining to criteria were the most frequently given answers to the question about promotions in the military, with 23% mentioning merit or performance and 15% time in service in November 1973. On the topic of military benefits, medical and dental care was brought up by 25% of the respondents and the G.I. Bill by 22% in the November 1973 survey. The only frequently mentioned comment dealing with military pay is that it is low; however, a decrease has been observed in the number of people feeling this way. In May

1971 37% stated that pay was low, while in November 1973 only 14% responded in that manner. Of the four topics discussed, youth indicated most familiarity with benefits and least with promotions in each survey.

Only about a third of the survey respondents had an accurate idea about the amount of military pay in November 1973. Underestimates outnumbered overestimates 40% to 18%. Other data collected in the three most recent Gilbert surveys, however, indicate that youth attach considerable monetary value to the benefits available to military personnel other than pay, and include such benefits in the comparison of military compensation with civilian income.

Of those surveyed in November 1973, 41% were aware of the combat arms enlistment bonus offered by the Army and Marine Corps. Of this number, only 4% knew from which services the bonus could be obtained.

Service Images

The Air Force was found to have the best image among the military services, ranking highest on overall ratings as the best service (30% in November 1973), as well as being the most frequently mentioned service on five of nine image factors. The Navy ranked second overall (24% in November 1973) and was the most frequently mentioned on two image factors. The Marine Corps was selected as the best service by 11% in November 1973 and also was most frequently mentioned on two image factors. The Army was also ranked as the best overall service by 11% of the respondents in November 1973, followed by the Coast Guard with 4%. These findings were consistent across all six surveys.

The relative ranking of the services did not vary when respondents with positive enlistment intent were compared with the other respondents on the image factors. The Army fared considerably better on the questions dealing with the most preferred service (both Regular and Reserve) among those with positive enlistment intent, drawing larger percentages of respondents than was the case for the image items.

Recruiting

In November 1973, 52% of the youth surveyed reported contact with military recruiters. Among the services, 31% had seen an Army recruiter, 22% a Navy recruiter, 17% an Air Force recruiter, and 14% a Marine Corps recruiter. Analyses revealed inconsistencies between the population subgroups reporting high levels of recruiter contact and those with high enlistment potential. The Air Force and Navy recruiters who had been in contact with those surveyed drew a higher rate of positive reactions than did the Army and Marine Corps recruiters.

Receipt of mailed recruiting literature was reported by 59% of the November 1973 respondents. Forty-seven percent had received information from the Army, 37% from the Navy, 32% from the Air Force, 27% from the Marine Corps, and 16% from the Coast Guard.

High school underclassmen reported the lowest level of receipt of recruiting information from each service in November 1973. Larger percentages of white than non-white interviewees acknowledged having received recruiting information from each service.

Among other sources of recruiting information, television was the most frequently mentioned (64% in November 1973), followed in order by posters, magazines and newspapers, radio, and non-mail literature. Gradual declines were reported across time for each of these sources of information.

PREFACE

This Consulting Report presents information on the attitudes of civilian youth toward military service in the all-volunteer force. The major emphasis is accorded results of a national survey of civilian youth conducted in November 1973. Included, for comparison purposes, are results from five previous youth surveys which, although all but one were conducted while the draft was still in effect, used questions about assumed no-draft behavior on the part of the respondents. Together, the results of the six surveys may be viewed as trends in the attitudes of youth.

In total, this report covers six cross-sectional surveys of civilian youth conducted for the Department of Defense by Gilbert Youth Research, Inc. Interviews and tabulations were performed by Gilbert Youth Research, under the direction of Mr. George Mihaly, President, and Mr. Gideon D. Rathnum, Vice President. Analyses of the tabulations were accomplished by the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) at the request of the Department of Defense.

The report was prepared by John R. Goral and Andrea Lipowitz of the HumRRO Eastern Division (formerly Division No. 7, Social Science). Dr. Robert G. Smith was Director of Division No. 7. Dr. J. Daniel Lyons is Director of the Eastern Division. Preparation of the report was accomplished for the Directorate for Manpower Research in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) under Contract Number F41609-73-C-0030.

The first report in this series dealt with the May 1971 survey findings and was entitled, "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: Results of a National Survey Conducted in May 1971," Human Resources Research Organization, October 1971. The second report compared findings from May 1971 with findings from a replication of the survey in November 1971 and was entitled, "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: A Comparison of Results of National Surveys Conducted in May 1971 and November 1971," HumRRO Consulting Report CR-D7-72-16, April 1972. The third report compared findings from a survey conducted in June 1972 with results from the previous two surveys and was entitled: "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: Results of National Surveys Conducted in May 1971, November 1971, and June 1972," DoD Manpower Research Report No. MA 72-2, August 1972 (see also HumRRO Consulting Report CR-D7-72-30, August 1972). The fourth report concentrates on data obtained from survey findings in November 1972, but also makes comparisons with three previous surveys. This report is entitled, "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service in a Zero-Draft Environment: Results of a National Survey Conducted in November 1972," HumRRO Consulting Report CR-D7-73-58, February 1974, AFHRL-TR-74-37, OASD (M&RA) 74-8 (in press). The fifth report compared May 1971 survey findings with the five previous surveys and was entitled, "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service in the All-Volunteer Force: Results From National Surveys Conducted Between May 1971 and May 1973," HumRRO Consulting Report CR-D7-74-148, May 1974.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This report presents findings from the first six Gilbert Youth surveys, conducted biannually since May of 1971. The concept of a continuing, national survey of civilian male youth was developed in 1971 as part of a systematic effort by the Department of Defense to study the enlistment motivation and attitudes toward military service held by American youth. It was anticipated that the results of such a project would provide valuable information to those concerned with forecasting accession levels, designing recruiting strategies, and structuring the all-volunteer force. The data collected in the Gilbert surveys and reported here represent a considerable contribution toward the establishment of the necessary data base.

Each of the surveys was conducted by Gilbert Youth Research, Inc., which also provided preliminary data tabulations. Additional tabulations, data analyses, and preparation of reports were accomplished by the Human Resources Research Organization for the Directorate for Manpower Research in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

Previous reports in this series¹ have been produced following each administration of the survey. This report deals primarily with results from the surveys conducted in 1973. However, considerable use of data from the earlier surveys is made when appropriate for comparison purposes.

¹ Allan H. Fisher, Jr. "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: Results of a National Survey Conducted in May 1971," HumRRO Consulting Report, October 1971.

Allan H. Fisher, Jr. "Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: A Comparison of Results of National Surveys Conducted in May 1971 and November 1971," HumRRO Consulting Report CR-D7-72-16, April 1972.

Allan H. Fisher, Jr. *Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service: Results of National Surveys Conducted in May 1971, November 1971, and June 1972*, DoD Manpower Research Report No. MA 72-2, August 1972 (HumRRO Consulting Report CR-D7-72-30), August 1972.

Allan H. Fisher, Jr., and Martha R. DiSario. *Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service in a Zero-Draft Environment: Results of a National Survey Conducted in November 1972*, AFHRL TR 74-37, OASD (M&RA) 74-8 (in press). (HumRRO Consulting Report CR-D7-73-58), June 1973.

John R. Goral and Andrea Lipowitz. *Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service in the All-Volunteer Force: Results From National Surveys Conducted Between May 1971 and May 1973*, HumRRO Consulting Report CR-D7-74-148, May 1974.

The samples used in this research are independent national probability samples representative of male civilian youth aged 16 to 21 years old. The samples are representative with respect to age, geographical region, and educational status. The projected population sizes for the November 1973 survey, by educational status, are high school students, 3,965,100; college students, 2,697,700; not in school, 3,426,500. In total, the survey sample is representative of the slightly more than 10.1 million American civilian males between the ages of 16 and 21.

In each survey, data were collected in personal interviews by peer interviewers working under professional supervision. In the November 1973 survey the sample size was 1,888 while 1,915 were interviewed in May 1973. The sample sizes used in the earlier surveys were: May 1971, 2,845; November 1971, 1,960; May 1972, 1,991; and November 1972, 1,924.

To fully utilize the representativeness of the samples employed, all percentages contained in the tables of this report make use of appropriately weighted data (unless otherwise indicated). These figures therefore are technically "projected" percentages rather than "observed" percentages. Estimates of the statistical reliability for the major sample breakdowns presented in this report are given in Appendix A.

Topics discussed in the following chapters include: enlistment intent, incentives and deterrents to enlistment, knowledge about military service, service images, and recruiting.

II. ENLISTMENT INTENT

A. THE REGULAR FORCE

Questions were asked in each of the six surveys about the likelihood of enlisting for active service as a regular. In the 1971 and 1972 surveys two questions were used, the first dealing with the status quo (draft environment), while the second asked whether the individual would join the military if there were no draft. Data discussed previously¹ demonstrated the minor effect of this distinction on the responses to these questions. With the elimination of the draft as a means of personnel procurement in 1973, the two most recent surveys did not require the second enlistment intent question. Results to be presented in this section are based on responses given under the no-draft situation in the 1971 and 1972 surveys in order to be comparable with the current all-volunteer status of the military.

The respondents were asked: "How likely is it that you will enlist for active service as a regular?" Responses for the total population of 16- to 21-year-old male civilians are indicated in Figure II-1, where the percentages of youth stating that they would definitely or probably enlist are shown.

Data regarding the timing of enlistment for those indicating positive intent were collected and are presented in Table II-1. This table displays the consistent finding that the majority of those with positive enlistment intent do not expect to join the military in the near future, that is, within 12 months after the date of the survey.

A desire for more detailed information regarding enlistment intent resulted in a further analysis of the data on the likelihood of enlistment. The population was broken down into seven distinct subgroups reflecting current education level and future aspirations. Those not in school were divided on the basis of highest level of education completed with three subgroups resulting: high school dropouts, high school graduates, and those with schooling beyond the high school level. Respondents attending high school at the time of the surveys formed three additional groups: non-seniors, seniors planning on continuing their education, and seniors either not continuing or not graduating. College students made up the seventh group in this analysis scheme.

The utilization of these groups in the data analysis marks the first time that such an approach has been used. Previously the population had been divided into three groups: high

¹ Goral and Lipowitz, *op. cit.*




Figure II-1. Intent to Enlist as a Regular (No-Draft)

Table II-1

Anticipated Date of Enlistment
(Base: Those Who Would Definitely or Probably Enlist)

Time of Enlistment	Percent					
	May 71	Nov 71	May 72	Nov 72	May 73	Nov 73
Within 6 months	14	14	15	15	15	10
6-12 months	14	23	14	26	11	18
Some future time/when eligible	72	63	71	59	73	72
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

school students, college students, and non-students. The decision to switch to a seven-group analysis was made because it was felt that such a framework would provide more useful information. For example, previous analyses using the high school students group have not distinguished the sophomores from the seniors, nor have they been able to deal with the differences between seniors planning on college and those headed for the job market. Preliminary data analyses revealed many differences among these groups which will be explored in this report.

The enlistment intent of each of the seven groups was assessed and is shown in Table II-2. Across all six surveys highest enlistment intent rates have been found among high school underclassmen (26% in May and 22% in November 1973) and seniors not continuing (25% in May and 18% in November 1973). In addition, comparable levels of enlistment

Table II-2
Subgroup Analysis of Enlistment Intent
*(Percent Who Would Definitely or Probably Enlist as a
Regular Under a No-Draft Condition)*

<u>Group</u>	<u>Survey Date</u>					
	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	7	12	24	16	22	19
H.S. Graduates	3	6	13	11	4	11
Post H.S. Education	5	15	4	6	4	5
H.S. Underclassmen	24	25	27	28	26	22
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	21	24	22	26	25	18
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	16	11	9	18	13	10
College Students	6	6	6	5	6	5
Overall	11	12	15	15	13	12

intent have occurred in the high school dropout group in the four most recent survey administrations (22% in May and 19% in November 1973). Considerably lower enlistment intent rates have been found among the four other population subgroups.

The stability of the relative enlistment propensities for the several subgroups across the six surveys demonstrates the value of analyzing the data at this level of specificity.

A final view of enlistment intent focused on racial differences. The sample in each survey was divided into white and non-white groups with the results indicated in Figure II-2. Non-whites have consistently reported higher enlistment intent than whites.

B. THE RESERVES AND NATIONAL GUARD

Survey respondents were asked to indicate the probability of their joining the Reserves or the National Guard after receiving a brief description of the benefits and requirements involved. For the purposes of this report, responses given to the question, assuming no draft, are presented. Figure II-3 contains these percentages.

Following the determination of these rates an analysis was conducted using the seven population subgroups defined previously in this section. Results of this query are shown in Table II-3. Highest Reserve/National Guard enlistment potential in the two most recent surveys was found among the high school underclassmen (16% in May and 22% in November 1973) and the non-high school graduates (15% in May and 16% in November 1973). The two groups consistently showing the lowest levels of Reserve/National Guard enlistment intent have been college students and those not currently in school who have received more than a high school education.

The consistent finding of a greater percentage of non-whites than whites indicating a possibility of enlisting in the Regular Force was also found with respect to the Reserves and National Guard with the exception of the most recent survey. In each of the first five surveys, the non-white sample yielded a higher total of positive replies to the question about joining the Reserves or the National Guard. Figure II-4 presents the racial comparison on this item for each survey.




Figure II-2 Racial Differences in Enlistment Intent




Figure II-3. Intent to Join the Reserves or National Guard (No-Draft)

Table II-3

Subgroup Analysis of Intent to Join the Reserves or National Guard
(Percent Who Would Definitely or Probably Join Under a No-Draft Condition)

Group	Survey Date					
	May 71	Nov 71	May 72	Nov 72	May 73	Nov 73
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	21	8	22	12	15	16
H.S. Graduates	4	7	7	4	10	12
Post H.S. Education	5	2	7	4	7	9
H.S. Underclassmen	15	23	17	15	16	22
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	13	13	10	17	14	13
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	5	8	11	10	14	13
College Students	7	6	4	4	8	6
Overall	9	10	11	9	12	13




Figure II-4. Racial Differences in Willingness to Join the Reserves or National Guard

C. THE ACTIVE OFFICER FORCE

Information was obtained from college juniors and seniors regarding their propensity to volunteer for active service as officers. Figure II-5 shows the percentages of college upperclassmen responding positively to this survey item. The apparent decline in enlistment potential from 13% in November 1971 to 9% in November 1972 did not continue in the 1973 surveys, instead the potential level has stabilized. This figure contains no entry for the May 71 survey because the question was not asked at that time.




Figure II-5. Likelihood of Volunteering for Active Duty as an Officer
(Base: College Juniors and Seniors)

D. OVERLAP IN ENLISTMENT INTENT

A previous report¹ has recognized and dealt with the occurrence of overlapping responses to the survey questions dealing with the Regular Force and the Reserves/National Guard. The possibility of this phenomenon results from the fact that the two items in question are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, it is quite possible for an individual to indicate positive intentions regarding both forms of military service. For some this might represent a future in which active service in the Regular Force may be followed by enlistment in a Reserve or National Guard unit. However, it is also possible that the expression of positive intent toward both forms of military service might merely reflect indecision as to which one will be chosen. Knowledge about the extent of this overlap is important to those utilizing the results of these surveys as estimates of future accession levels.

¹ Fisher and DiSario, *op. cit.*

In the May 1973 survey, 13% indicated willingness to enlist in the Regular Force while 12% responded positively toward the item about the Reserves or National Guard. Subsequent analysis revealed an overlap of 4%. This means that 9% were interested only in the Regular force, 8% were interested only in the Reserves or National Guard, and 4% were considering both types of military service. The amount of overlap in the most recent (November 1973) survey was also found to be 4%. Of the total youth sample, 8% were interested only in the Regular Force, 9% only in the Reserves or National Guard, and 4% in both.

III. INCENTIVES TO ENLISTMENT

A. THE REGULAR FORCE

With the implementation of the all-volunteer force, there is a necessity for information about the motivating forces, both current and potential, related to the decision to join one of the military services. Knowledge of the reasons which attract youth to and deter them from enlisting is critical if the effort to procure an adequate number of new recruits is to succeed in the years ahead.

In order to determine the relative strength of various incentives for enlistment in the Regular Force, two sets of questions were asked. In the first, only those indicating a possibility of entering service were asked to indicate which incentives exerted a strong influence on them. The second set dealt with the reactions of the total sample to a list of potential incentives.

Table III-1 shows the percentages of respondents indicating a possibility of entering service, who attributed strong influence to a list of general enlistment incentives. In the two most recent survey administrations the most frequently cited reasons for enlisting were: travel, excitement, and new experiences (52% in May and 56% in November 1973), and learning a trade or skill valuable in civilian life (51% in May and 60% in November 1973). Least often mentioned were the negative reasons of draft avoidance (12% in May and 7% in November 1973), and escaping from personal problems (8% in May and 13% in November 1973). All of the other incentives were mentioned by at least 25% in the November 1973 survey.

Reactions of the total samples to a lengthy list of potential incentives provide informative data regarding the relative utility of various types of incentives. The response distributions to the question asking for the incentive most likely to induce enlistment are shown on Table III-2. The two incentives consistently most often chosen involve college education. In the survey conducted during May 1973, 14% listed payment for four years of college in return for a four year service commitment as the incentive most likely to induce enlistment while 11% chose a \$200 per month payment for up to four years of college. These percentages rose to 18% and 13%, respectively, in the November 1973 survey. It is apparent from viewing Table III-2 that the drop in endorsement given to the incentive providing four years of college in return for four years of service, occurring between the November 1971 and May 1972 surveys, was caused by the addition of the other incentive related to college education.

Table III-1

Percent Attributing Strong Influence to Reasons for Enlistment
(Base: Respondents Expecting to Enter Service)

<u>Reasons for Enlisting</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
To learn trade or skill valuable in civilian life	32	37	49	50	51	60
Travel, excitement, and new experiences	38	41	46	52	52	56
Choice of service branch	45	46	48	54	45	50
Opportunity for advanced education and training	30	32	42	39	42	46
To serve my country	33	28	34	37	30	40
Overall benefits	9	17	24	25	27	39
To fulfill military obligation at time of choice	32	31	32	30	26	35
To become more mature and self-reliant	19	23	26	29	22	35
Career opportunities in the military look better than in civilian life	15	16	22	26	26	33
To qualify for the G.I. Bill	15	17	19	24	19	26
To get a bonus for enlisting	--	--	--	23	20	25
To leave personal problems behind	8	6	8	8	8	13
To avoid the draft	19	20	18	19	12	7

Next highest in popularity were the guarantee of assignments in one's military specialty and training for a civilian job. Across the six surveys, the percentage of respondents rejecting all of the incentives from 15% to 23%.

Analyses of the four most popular incentives were conducted based on the seven previously defined population subgroups and race to explore the possibility of differential appeal of these incentives. High school dropouts, high school graduates, and those seniors not planning on continuing showed least support for the incentive providing four years of college (Table III-3). In contrast, high levels of support for this incentive were given by college students and continuing high school seniors.

While a similar set of results might be expected for the other college-related incentive, Table III-4 does not reveal a consistent pattern of differences. In the most recent survey (November 1973), continuing high school seniors rated this incentive higher than the other subgroups, while it drew least support from the three subgroups composed of individuals not in school.

Table III-5 shows that assistance in finding a civilian job and training, if necessary, was most popular among the high school dropouts and non-continuing high school seniors during the first three Gilbert Youth Surveys. There was no preference apparent by any of the subgroups in the three most recent surveys.

No consistent, sizable deviations from the overall percentage choosing guaranteed assignments in one's military specialty are apparent in Table III-6. This indicates no

Table III-2
Incentive Most Likely to Induce Enlistment

Proposed Incentive	Percent Choosing Proposed Incentives					
	May 71	Nov 71	May 72	Nov 72	May 73	Nov 73
4 years college in return for 4 years service	24	25	16	14	14	18
\$200/month for 4 years of college	12	13	11	13
Training for a civilian job	10	9	9	8	9	10
Guaranteed assignments in military specialty	8	10	9	7	9	7
Military pay comparable to civilian income	7	7	5	8	5	6
2 years tech school prior to service	3	5	5	5
\$3000 critical skill bonus for 3 years enlistment	3	6	4	4
Geographic assignments of choice	6	7	6	5	5	4
Shorter enlistment period	7	8	5	4	4	4
2 years tech school for 4 years service	6	6	3	3	3	3
A large enlistment bonus	4	4	3	3	3	3
Opportunity to change job assignments	2	3	3	2	3	3
Right to live off-base	2	2	3	3	3	3
Chance to enroll in officer training	1	2	1	2	1	1
Better living conditions for single servicemen	1	1	1	1	1	1
None of these	23	16	18	18	20	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

differential appeal of this incentive among the population subgroups studied. It should be noted that for this incentive as well as the other three most popular incentives, no significant racial differences were found.

A subgroup analysis of those failing to choose any of the incentives was conducted; results are presented in Table III-7. This table shows the consistent tendency of the three out-of-school groups to have the highest level of incentive rejection while the high school underclassmen show the least.

Results pertaining to a similar incentive question seeking the potential incentive most likely to induce enlistment in a combat branch of service were quite different from those based on the question dealing with enlistment in general. Table III-8 shows the relative appeal of the 15 incentives. In the most recent survey, 38% of the respondents indicated that none of the incentives would induce enlistment in a combat branch. The level of incentive rejection for this question is about twice that found when the combat branch stipulation is not made.

Table III-3

**Percent Choosing Four Years College in Return for
Four Years Service as the Incentive Most Likely to Induce Enlistment**

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	20	15	10	11	7	7
H.S. Graduates	13	21	11	8	10	11
Post H.S. Education	22	19	15	9	14	17
H.S. Underclassmen	29	24	16	15	17	18
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	11	16	11	7	9	12
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	34	31	17	24	16	24
College Students	23	29	21	19	16	24
Race						
White	24	25	16	14	15	18
Non-white	22	27	13	13	13	16
Overall	24	25	16	14	14	18

Table III-4

**Percent Choosing \$200/Month for Four Years of
College as the Incentive Most Likely to Induce Enlistment**

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level				
H.S. Dropouts	12	16	9	8
H.S. Graduates	10	15	9	10
Post H.S. Education	10	9	10	8
H.S. Underclassmen	14	12	11	16
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	17	7	8	13
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	16	17	11	20
College Students	10	12	14	13
Race				
White	12	13	10	13
Non-white	15	12	15	12
Overall	12	13	11	13

Table III-5

**Percent Choosing Training for a Civilian Job as the
Incentive Most Likely to Induce Enlistment**

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	18	22	17	5	11	12
H.S. Graduates	9	8	10	9	9	14
Post H.S. Education	5	12	4	9	7	11
H.S. Underclassmen	14	10	11	8	12	10
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	16	13	16	11	7	8
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	10	9	7	9	12	12
College Students	6	7	6	6	8	8
Race						
White	10	10	9	7	9	10
Non-white	7	7	11	11	9	12
Overall	10	9	9	8	9	10

Table III-6

**Percent Choosing Guaranteed Assignments in Military Specialty
As the Incentive Most Likely to Induce Enlistment**

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	6	12	10	8	4	10
H.S. Graduates	7	13	6	8	12	9
Post H.S. Education	7	12	14	4	6	6
H.S. Underclassmen	9	9	10	8	8	6
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	12	10	9	8	14	8
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	7	6	6	4	9	5
College Students	8	12	9	8	12	8
Race						
White	8	11	9	7	10	7
Non-white	6	8	9	6	6	8
Overall	8	10	9	7	9	7

Table III-7

**Percent Indicating That None of the Proposed Incentives
Would Induce Enlistment**

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	31	16	15	18	36	28
H.S. Graduates	33	19	14	24	30	21
Post H.S. Education	36	18	23	40	28	23
H.S. Underclassmen	8	10	12	11	12	9
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	14	12	18	10	19	17
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	20	12	18	11	14	15
College Students	27	17	25	17	16	14
Race						
White	24	15	18	18	20	15
Non-white	13	18	16	18	21	22
Overall	23	16	18	18	20	16

Among the combat incentives, the three most preferred in November 1973 were each selected by 7% of those interviewed. These were: a shorter enlistment period, the guarantee of training and assignment in the military specialty of choice, and four years of college in return for four years of military service. Racial and educational subgroup analyses were conducted for these incentives. No significant differential appeal among the educational subgroups was found for any of the three incentives in November 1973. The most recent survey, however, did replicate the consistent previous finding of the slightly greater appeal of these incentives to the white segment of the population.

The analysis presented in Table III-9 indicates that the percentages of those not in school (especially those with at least a high school diploma) who reject all of the combat branch incentives are substantially higher than those found among the three subgroups composed of high school students. The percentage of college students not willing to enlist in a combat branch has fluctuated. In the first four Gilbert surveys this percentage was at the level of the out-of-school groups; however, in the May 1973 survey it fell to the level of the high school students. In the most recent survey, the percentage of college students refusing to name a combat branch incentive had risen to the level of the three out-of-school subgroups.

The November 1973 survey revealed a pronounced shift by race in willingness to enlist in a combat branch. Previously the percentage of non-whites failing to choose a combat incentive had been slightly lower than the percentage of whites. In November 1973, 48% of the non-whites did not pick an incentive, compared to 38% of the whites.

B. THE RESERVES AND NATIONAL GUARD

Questions dealing with incentives for joining the Reserves or National Guard were handled similarly to those pertaining to the Regular Force. One method was to ask those indicating positive enlistment intent their reasons for wanting to join the Reserves or National Guard. Results of this inquiry, shown in Table III-10, indicate that skills training

Table III-8

Incentive Most Likely to Induce Enlistment in Combat Branch of Service

Incentive	Percent Choosing Most Likely Incentive					
	May 71	Nov 71	May 72	Nov 72	May 73	Nov 73
Shorter enlistment period	11	11	7	7	7	7
Guaranteed assignments in military specialty	6	10	9	6	7	7
4 years college in return for 4 years service	7	8	6	5	5	7
Opportunity to change job assignments	7	8	5	5	5	6
\$200/month for 4 years college	--	--	5	4	5	6
\$3000 critical skill bonus for 3 year enlistment	--	--	6	7	6	5
Military pay comparable to civilian income	5	6	5	5	4	4
Training for a civilian job	5	3	4	3	4	4
A large enlistment bonus	5	6	5	4	5	3
Geographical assignment of choice	5	3	3	3	3	3
2 years tech school prior to service	--	--	2	3	2	3
2 years tech school for 4 years service	1	3	2	2	2	2
Chance to enroll in officer training	2	2	2	2	2	2
Right to live off-base	1	1	2	2	1	2
Better living conditions	1	1	1	1	1	1
None of these	45	37	39	42	41	38
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

has consistently ranked as the most often chosen reason (41% in November 1973), followed by educational benefits (30% in November 1973). Supplemental income has displaced draft avoidance as the third most frequently mentioned reason.

Data were also collected in each survey on the relative appeal of eight proposed Reserve/National Guard incentives. The total samples were asked to state their first preference among the eight incentives with the option of rejecting all of them. Table III-11 shows the results obtained. By far the most popular incentive in each survey has been increased education benefits (21% in November 1973). Additionally, four other incentives have received more than minimal interest: a \$600 enlistment bonus; a 50% pay increase; full-time insurance coverage; and a shorter initial active duty training period.

Each of these incentives was examined in greater detail to study the potential ramifications on force composition. Table III-12 presents the subgroup analysis of respondents choosing educational benefits as their most preferred incentive. The highest endorsement of this incentive in November 1973 was given by continuing high school seniors (26%) followed by those currently receiving or who had received post high school

Table III-9

Percent of Respondents Who Would Not Enlist in a Combat Branch

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	43	36	26	46	51	38
H.S. Graduates	54	45	39	52	57	50
Post H.S. Education	55	48	52	63	56	52
H.S. Underclassmen	25	26	25	32	29	21
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	36	23	36	28	40	23
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	43	26	37	28	34	34
College Students	54	45	53	44	37	49
Race						
White	46	37	39	42	41	38
Non-white	33	35	34	38	40	48
Overall	45	37	39	42	41	39

Table III-10

Reasons Cited for Enlisting in the Reserves/National Guard

(Base: Those Definitely or Probably Enlisting in the Reserves or National Guard)

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Percent Choosing Reasons</u>					
	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Training in skills usable in civilian life	43	50	56	57	48	41
Educational benefits	41	37	42	47	40	30
Supplemental income	24	22	29	23	36	25
Avoid being drafted	32	31	27	21	22	17
Advancement opportunities in the Reserves	18	14	17	19	15	15
Patriotic duty	23	23	24	17	13	14
Association with friends	15	17	20	16	13	12

education (24%). However, these results have not been found in all five previous surveys. No consistent racial differences are evident.

Table III-13 shows high school dropouts and underclassmen to be the groups most interested in a \$600 bonus in November 1973. Individuals with more than a high school education showed the least endorsement of this incentive in November 1973. Again, as with educational benefits, these findings did not occur consistently in earlier surveys. The racial analysis shows more support for the \$600 bonus among non-whites (with the exception of the first Gilbert survey).

No consistent differences among groups were found when considering the 50% pay increase incentive (Table III-14). All subgroups had preference percentages close to the overall rates.

Table III-11

First Preference Among Reserve/National Guard Incentives

<u>Proposed Incentive</u>	<u>Percent Choosing Proposed Incentives</u>					
	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational benefits (\$2,000 maximum value)	17	24	22	18	21	21
\$600 bonus	7	11	8	11	13	14
50% pay increase	8	10	10	11	11	13
Full-time insurance coverage (\$15,000 at a cost of \$3 per month)	5	6	9	10	10	13
Shorter initial active duty training period	11	13	11	9	10	12
Quarters allowance for dependents during active duty	3	3	4	4	5	5
Modification of the 6-year enlistment option	5	5	6	4	5	5
Cancellation of up to 50% of NDEA student loan	2	2	4	2	4	3
None would cause enlistment	43	26	26	31	22	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table III-12

Subgroup Analysis of Respondents Choosing Education Benefits as Their First Preference Among Reserve/National Guard Incentives

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percent Choosing Education Benefits</u>					
	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	9	21	13	18	10	16
H.S. Graduates	17	17	21	17	18	14
Post H.S. Education	14	24	19	18	18	24
H.S. Underclassmen	22	26	26	20	23	18
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	21	22	27	15	28	20
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	10	27	23	18	28	26
College Students	21	25	22	18	23	24
Race						
White	17	24	23	19	21	21
Non-White	20	17	19	14	22	15
Overall	17	24	22	18	21	21

Table III-13

**Subgroup Analysis of Respondents Choosing a \$600 Bonus as Their
First Preference Among Reserve/National Guard Incentives**

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percent Choosing a \$600 Bonus</u>					
	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	8	15	18	15	22	30
H.S. Graduates	7	11	5	6	9	14
Post H.S. Education	4	19	5	4	5	7
H.S. Underclassmen	10	17	13	19	20	19
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	13	16	8	25	19	14
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	9	11	11	13	12	12
College Students	2	5	2	4	8	9
Race						
White	7	11	7	10	12	13
Non-white	5	15	13	16	16	19
Overall	7	11	8	11	13	14

Table III-14

**Subgroup Analysis of Respondents Choosing a 50% Pay Increase as Their
First Preference Among Reserve/National Guard Incentives**

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percent Choosing a 50% Pay Increase</u>					
	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	6	9	9	16	13	14
H.S. Graduates	8	10	11	12	9	15
Post H.S. Education	7	14	9	6	7	15
H.S. Underclassmen	11	9	10	14	11	12
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	8	9	12	10	16	14
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	11	12	7	10	12	12
College Students	7	10	10	10	12	11
Race						
White	8	10	10	11	11	12
Non-white	12	12	8	14	7	16
Overall	8	10	10	11	11	13

The subgroup analysis of the full-time insurance coverage incentive (Table III-15) reveals highest support in November 1973 from the high school seniors not continuing their educations (20%), while only 6% of the high school dropouts chose this incentive. These

Table III-15

**Subgroup Analysis of Respondents Choosing Full-Time Insurance Coverage
As Their First Preference Among Reserve/National Guard Incentives**

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percent Choosing Full-Time Insurance Coverage</u>					
	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	12	8	13	7	9	6
H.S. Graduates	4	5	10	7	10	13
Post H.S. Education	3	2	6	8	7	10
H.S. Underclassmen	8	10	11	15	12	16
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	4	12	9	13	14	20
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	1	6	11	15	11	16
College Students	4	4	4	7	10	12
Race						
White	5	6	8	10	10	13
Non-white	8	5	12	9	14	12
Overall	5	6	9	10	10	13

subgroup differences were not evident in all five earlier Gilbert Youth Surveys. No large or consistent racial differences were found.

Little difference between subgroups is indicated in Table III-16 in the first five surveys; however, in November 1973 the high school graduates subgroup expressed the

Table III-16

**Subgroup Analysis of Respondents Choosing a Shorter Initial Active
Duty Training Period as Their First Preference Among
Reserve/National Guard Incentives**

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percent Choosing Shorter Training Period</u>					
	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	3	13	13	6	11	9
H.S. Graduates	8	17	16	13	11	18
Post H.S. Education	11	14	6	6	9	14
H.S. Underclassmen	13	14	11	5	10	11
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	8	13	10	11	10	5
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	15	14	10	6	12	13
College Seniors	11	10	11	12	10	11
Race						
White	11	13	12	9	10	13
Non-white	5	10	11	9	8	9
Overall	11	13	11	9	10	12

greatest interest (18%) in a shorter initial active duty training period, while the high school seniors not continuing showed the least (5%). Again no significant racial differences are apparent.

Table III-17 presents the subgroup analysis of those youth indicating that none of the Reserve/National Guard incentives listed would cause them to enlist. The overall percentage found in November 1973 (14%) was less than one-third of that observed in May 1971 (43%), indicating a greater willingness on the part of respondents to at least consider the Reserves or National Guard. No significant deviation from the overall rate in November 1973 is evident either for the education level subgroups or by race.

Table III-17

Subgroup Analysis of Respondents Indicating That None of the Reserve/National Guard Incentives Would Cause Enlistment

Group	Percent Indicating No Incentives					
	May 71	Nov 71	May 72	Nov 72	May 73	Nov 73
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	60	27	23	31	32	13
H.S. Graduates	49	33	22	42	32	15
Post H.S. Education	51	18	38	51	39	16
H.S. Underclassmen	31	18	21	17	11	14
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	35	16	24	17	13	18
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	44	20	23	21	22	11
College Students	41	30	31	36	22	16
Race						
White	43	25	26	31	22	14
Non-white	40	32	25	28	24	19
Overall	43	26	26	31	22	14

In the four most recent surveys, respondents were asked whether they would join the Reserve or National Guard under two potential enlistment bonus conditions, an \$1100 enlistment bonus and a \$2200 critical skill bonus. Table III-18 presents the subgroup analyses of enlistment intent for these two bonus situations. Comparing the overall enlistment rates in this table with the rates presented in Figure II-3 (intent under current conditions), it is obvious that the implementation of either bonus would substantially increase the number of individuals attempting to enter the Reserves and National Guard.

In the most recent survey Table III-18 shows highest support for the \$1100 bonus among high school underclassmen (36%), while college students (15%) and those out of school with more than a high school education (14%) indicated less interest. Greatest interest in the critical skill bonus in November 1973 was shown by the high school dropouts (44%) and high school underclassmen (43%) while those out of school with more than a high school education showed the least interest (26%). For each bonus condition in all of the surveys, (with the exception of the \$2200 bonus in the November 1973 survey), the non-white respondents had higher enlistment intent rates than the whites.

Table III-18

**Reserve/National Guard Enlistment Intent Under
Two Proposed Bonus Conditions**

(Percent Who Would Definitely or Probably Join)

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 72</u>		<u>Nov 72</u>		<u>May 73</u>		<u>Nov 73</u>	
	<u>\$1,100/\$2,200</u>		<u>\$1,100/\$2,200</u>		<u>\$1,100/\$2,200</u>		<u>\$1,100/\$2,200</u>	
Educational Level								
H.S. Dropouts	39	48	31	42	17	25	25	44
H.S. Graduates	22	38	17	31	17	24	24	36
Post H.S. Education	16	30	13	22	16	26	14	26
H.S. Underclassmen	36	48	44	53	32	43	36	43
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	27	44	40	55	28	39	26	40
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	31	43	35	48	23	41	26	29
College Students	14	22	14	28	20	33	15	30
Race								
White	25	36	25	37	22	33	23	35
Non-white	34	46	35	45	29	44	27	31
Overall	25	37	26	39	23	34	23	35

IV. DETERRENTS TO ENLISTMENT

A. THE REGULAR FORCE

A large proportion of the male youth population do not indicate any desire to join the military. Therefore, it is important for military planners and recruiters to have an understanding of the major reasons for this negative attitude. Questions were included in each administration of the Gilbert survey to investigate various deterrents to military service.

Table IV-1 presents the major findings from a question which asked all respondents what conditions existing in the Military Services would most likely keep them from enlisting. The most often cited reason for not enlisting in the first four surveys was the "high risk of injury." This reason fell to third place in the 1973 surveys (47%), undoubtedly due, at least in part, to the cessation of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. More frequently mentioned in 1973 were "strict discipline/training conditions" (51%) and "extended time away from home" (48% in May and 52% in November). These two reasons were also the only conditions besides the "high risk of injury" to be consistently mentioned in earlier

Table IV-1

Percent Indicating Current Conditions in the Military Services Which Would Deter Enlistment

Condition	May 71	Nov 71	May 72	Nov 72	May 73	Nov 73
Extended time away from home	48	41	53	47	48	52
Strict discipline/training conditions	43	44	53	49	51	51
High risk of injury	57	55	57	53	47	47
Insufficient initial pay	41	36	41	40	40	40
Post-service Reserve obligation	---	--	--	35	39	39
Poor living conditions for single servicemen	32	32	39	39	39	37
Insufficient pay over career	33	31	37	36	37	37
Lack of career opportunities	30	28	36	30	33	33
Low level of associates	26	26	34	31	33	32

surveys by more than 40% of the respondents. A significant number of individuals (between 25% and 40%) indicated each of the other deterrents in Table IV-1.

Detailed analyses were conducted on the three most frequently mentioned deterrents, with the results presented in Tables IV-2, IV-3, and IV-4.

Table IV-2 shows the high school dropouts to be the group most deterred by extended time away from home in the Gilbert surveys conducted in November 1972 and in May 1973. This was not the case in November 1973 nor in earlier surveys where no obvious group difference patterns were evident. Race was not consistently related to the deterrent of extended time away from home.

Table IV-2

**Percent Indicating That Extended Time Away From Home
Would Deter Enlistment**

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	57	42	54	59	65	53
H.S. Graduates	42	45	45	48	47	55
Post H.S. Education	46	53	50	48	43	49
H.S. Underclassmen	44	42	61	47	51	54
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	48	48	57	47	51	56
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	70	38	57	45	44	53
College Students	40	37	50	44	47	48
Race						
White	49	41	53	48	48	51
Non-white	39	44	62	44	54	59
Overall	48	41	53	47	48	52

Table IV-3

**Percent Indicating That Strict Discipline and Training Conditions
Would Deter Enlistment**

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	33	49	51	45	52	44
H.S. Graduates	41	38	43	45	52	53
Post H.S. Education	50	40	56	56	48	56
H.S. Underclassmen	39	42	52	42	44	48
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	28	43	57	50	51	40
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	45	47	52	45	54	49
College Students	49	48	58	57	58	54
Race						
White	44	45	53	50	50	50
Non-white	38	41	54	45	58	52
Overall	43	44	53	49	51	51

Table IV-4

Percent Indicating That the High Risk of Injury Would Deter Enlistment

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	42	45	57	46	69	43
H.S. Graduates	54	51	37	45	38	40
Post H.S. Education	51	44	53	48	37	39
H.S. Underclassmen	60	57	68	56	49	58
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	54	55	69	62	60	50
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	63	56	62	60	44	51
College Students	59	57	56	54	53	44
Race						
White	56	54	56	52	46	45
Non-white	65	62	69	60	60	60
Overall	57	55	57	53	47	47

The subgroup analysis of those listing strict discipline and training conditions as a major deterrent to enlistment is found in Table IV-3. No consistent differences among educational subgroups are indicated. No meaningful racial differences are evident either.

The major findings in Table IV-4 is the consistently greater percentage of non-whites than whites choosing the high risk of injury as a deterrent to enlistment. Among the seven subgroups, those out of school with at least a high school diploma were consistently lower than the other groups in all six surveys. The only subgroup above the overall survey rate in all of the surveys was the high school underclassmen.

Another approach to studying enlistment deterrents involved asking the respondents if there were strong personal considerations preventing them from joining the military. Those responding affirmatively were asked to choose the major reason deterring enlistment from among those shown in Figure IV-1. Attitudes toward military service have tended to be more favorable on the first of these questions. In May 1971, 65% stated that they would be deterred from enlistment by personal considerations. This was dropped to 60% in November 1971 and 59% in May and November 1972. In May 1973, 55% indicated personal considerations strongly deterring enlistment, while the most recent figure (November 1973) has dropped to 54%.

Figure IV-1 indicates that the two major deterrents in 1973 were the related concepts of personal freedom and life style. In earlier surveys opposition to war or the military equalled or surpassed these two reasons. The "fear of injury or death" also appears to be decreasing over time as a major deterrent to joining the military.

B. THE RESERVES AND NATIONAL GUARD

Table IV-5 shows the deterrents to enlisting in the Reserve and National Guard mentioned by those respondents stating that they did not intend to join. In all six Gilbert Youth surveys, the three deterrents consistently most often mentioned have been insufficient pay (34% in November 1973), conflict with civilian job (33% in November 1973), and a general dislike of the military (32% in November 1973). An increasing trend in dissatisfaction with pay is evident across time, while the percent reporting a general dislike of the military has decreased.




Figure IV-1. Personal Considerations Most Likely to Prevent Joining Military Service
 (Base: Those With Personal Considerations Strongly Deterring Voluntary Enlistment)

Table IV-5

Deterrents to Reserve/National Guard Enlistment
(Base: Those Not Intending to Join the Reserves or National Guard)

<u>Deterrent</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Insufficient pay	24	27	29	32	32	34
Conflict with civilian job	26	32	34	30	31	33
General dislike of the military	44	45	38	34	33	32
Military regulations (hair cut, etc.)	25	28
Weekend training requirements	16	25	21	20	20	18
Possibility of active service in a war	16	16	17
Family would object to time away from home	11	13	15	14	13	17
Employer would object to absence for annual training	9	13	12	12	12	15
Attitude of friends toward the military	4	6	7	6	7	8
Eliminates chance for part- time job	7	6

V. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT MILITARY SERVICE

Another important topic dealt with extensively in the Gilbert surveys is knowledge of the military. It must be assumed that attitudes toward the military and the decision whether or not to join are based to some extent on an individual's knowledge of various aspects of military life. Several questions in the Gilbert surveys were asked to ascertain the level and accuracy of respondents' knowledge about the military.

A series of questions used in each survey involved vocational training, promotions, benefits, and pay. Responses have been content-analyzed and the results are contained in the following tables. Table V-1 deals with the most often mentioned comments on vocational training. There were consistent positive statements dealing with the quality (16% in November 1973) and range (14% in November 1973) of training in the military. Sixteen percent of the respondents claimed no knowledge of military vocational training in November 1973.

Table V-2 presents frequently mentioned aspects of promotions. The response most often given in each of the six surveys (23% in November 1973) was that promotions in the military are based on merit or performance. Another set of responses referring to promotion criteria (time in service) has ranked second in the frequency of mention in the past four surveys (15% in November 1973). A decreasing trend is observed for the two negative

Table V-1

Frequently Mentioned Aspects of Military Vocational Training

Response	Percent Mentioning Training Aspect					
	May 71	Nov 71	May 72	Nov 72	May 73	Nov 73
Training is good/best available	16	16	15	14	17	16
All types of training available	19	15	17	13	19	14
Good in some areas/fields	9	10	9	10	7	6
Good chance to learn new and useful skills	5	10	8	9	5	9
Allows your choice of skill training	--	--	7	12	9	1
Don't know/no knowledge	25	19	22	20	23	16

Table V-2

Frequently Mentioned Aspects of Military Promotions

Response	Percent Mentioning Promotions Aspect					
	May 71	Nov 71	May 72	Nov 72	May 73	Nov 73
Based on merit/performance	15	14	21	23	19	23
Based on time in service	10	7	18	16	14	15
Based on service-wide exams	4	4	7	9	6	8
Possibility exists (general statement)	11	9	3	5	4	6
Difficult to obtain	8	7	4	3	4	4
Too slow	7	6	3	2	2	3
Don't know/no knowledge	31	30	36	29	34	33

comments in this table ("difficult to obtain" and "too slow"). In November 1973, 33% of the respondents indicated no knowledge about the military promotion system.

Medical and dental care (25%) and general references to the G.I. Bill (22%) were the most frequent answers to the question about military benefits (Table V-3) in November 1973. A third response to this question, which had been mentioned most often in November 1971 and May 1972 but declined in subsequent surveys (19% in November 1973), related to the education benefits provided by the military. A lower rate of don't know responses (12% in November 1973) were given to this question in all surveys than for the other topics of vocational training, promotions, and pay.

Table V-3

Frequently Mentioned Aspects of Military Benefits

Response	Percent Mentioning Benefits Aspect					
	May 71	Nov 71	May 72	Nov 72	May 73	Nov 73
Paid medical and dental care	18	20	23	25	27	25
G.I. Bill (general reference)	30	18	11	17	27	22
Paid education	21	25	25	22	17	19
All needs taken care of	9	12	15	17	17	18
Pension/retirement benefits	15	15	16	14	12	13
Skills/vocational training	15	9	13	11	8	11
Chance to travel/European trip	11	9	11	8	8	10
Commissary/PX privileges	8	6	6	8	7	6
Don't know/no knowledge	15	12	14	12	14	12

The only frequently mentioned comment regarding military pay (14% in November 1973) has been that it is low. However, the percentage of respondents giving this type of answer has declined considerably and remained stable over the last three surveys (Figure V-1). This decrease in dissatisfaction with pay reflects the publicity surrounding recent pay increases in the services. The percentage indicating no knowledge in this area has consistently been near the level of 28% found in November 1973.




Figure V-1. Frequently Mentioned Aspects of Military Pay

An interest in the accuracy of information held by youth with regard to military pay led to the analyses presented in Tables V-4 and V-5. All respondents in the four most recent surveys were asked to estimate how much money they would earn in their first year as an enlisted man. The results, shown in Table V-4, indicate considerable variability among respondents.

A criterion by which to evaluate these answers was constructed by assuming the standard rate of promotion for a first-year enlisted man (starting as an E1 and reaching E3 before the end of the first year) and applying the appropriate monthly pay to arrive at an annual income figure. The correct answers (as defined by this criterion) are approximately \$3750 for May and November 1972, \$4000 for May 1973, and \$4250 for the November 1973 survey. Allowing for a reasonable error margin in each direction (\$750), respondents' answers can be classified as underestimates, accurate, or overestimates. An answer of \$3000 or less would qualify as an underestimate, while any response above \$4500 would be considered an overestimate in the two surveys conducted in 1972. Using these definitions, Table V-5 shows that in May 1972, 44% underestimated annual military pay and 16%

Table V-4

Estimated Annual Income of a First Year Enlisted Man

<u>Estimated Income</u>	<u>Percent Estimating Annual Income</u>			
	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Less than \$2,000	16	13	10	8
\$2,001 to \$2,500	14	15	12	11
\$2,501 to \$3,000	14	14	12	10
\$3,001 to \$3,500	13	15	12	11
\$3,501 to \$4,000	13	13	17	18
\$4,001 to \$4,500	6	6	8	8
\$4,501 to \$5,000	7	8	9	12
\$5,001 to \$7,500	6	7	8	12
\$7,501 or more	3	5	5	6
Don't know	7	4	8	4
Total	100	100	100	100

Table V-5

Annual Civilian Income Judged Comparable to Military Income
(Considering All Military Benefits and Pay)

<u>Comparable Civilian Income</u>	<u>Percent Judging Comparable Civilian Income</u>			
	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Less than \$2,500	7	8	6	6
\$2,501 to \$3,500	7	8	10	9
\$3,501 to \$4,500	10	15	13	11
\$4,501 to \$5,000	8	11	11	10
\$5,001 to \$7,500	33	24	20	22
\$7,501 or more	30	32	34	38
Don't know	5	3	7	4
Total	100	100	100	100

overestimated. The comparable figures for November 1972 were very similar—42% classified as underestimates and 20% as overestimates.

Due to the pay raise enacted in January 1973, the cutoffs for under- and overestimates were placed at \$3250 and \$4750 respectively for the May 1973 survey. The October 1973 pay raise caused these limits to be revised again to \$3500 and \$5000 for the November 1973 survey. With these ranges, the percentage of underestimates in both 1973 surveys was constant (40%). The same was true of overestimates in 1973 (18%).

Two major conclusions can be drawn from this analysis: (a) about one-third of the population of male civilian youth have a fairly accurate idea of how much money they would make initially if they joined the military; and (b) about twice as many of those without an accurate idea tend to underestimate pay rather than overestimate it.

In view of the fact that there are many non-financial benefits in the military that an individual would have to pay for as a civilian, respondents were asked for an estimate of annual civilian income that would be comparable to that of a first year enlisted man.

Table V-5 presents the responses to this question. In May 1972, 32% listed a civilian income of \$5000 or less while in November 1972 and May 1973 the comparable results were 42% and 40%. In the most recent survey, 36% estimated \$5000 or less. A middle range of answers (\$5001 to \$7500) drew 22% of the respondents in November 1973 while an increasing trend was observed in the \$7501 and above category (38% in November 1973).

Considering this information in conjunction with that presented in Table V-4, it appears that while a sizeable percentage of respondents underestimate military pay, the perceived value of other military benefits enhances the overall comparison with civilian employment alternatives.

A final area of inquiry dealing with knowledge of the military involved the combat arms bonus. This is an enlistment bonus offered by the Army and the Marine Corps to high school graduates enlisting in a combat arms unit for a period of four years or more. It was initiated in June 1972. Questions in the November 1972 and May and November 1973 Gilbert Youth surveys asked about respondent awareness of this bonus as well as which services offer it and what commitments are incurred.

Table V-6 presents the subgroup analysis of the percentages indicating that they were aware of the bonus. Overall, it is noteworthy that in November 1973 a smaller percentage of youth knew about the bonus than was the case in either of the two earlier surveys in which this question was asked. Among the subgroups, the only consistent finding is that high school dropouts, as a group, are less aware of this bonus. Analysis conducted by race indicates a greater awareness of the combat arms bonus among whites than non-whites.

Table V-6

**Percent of Youth Indicating Awareness of the
Combat Arms Enlistment Bonus**

<u>Group</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level			
H.S. Dropouts	37	39	23
H.S. Graduates	34	40	43
Post H.S. Education	39	49	47
H.S. Underclassmen	51	48	36
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	51	56	39
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	48	50	36
College Students	48	46	49
Race			
White	48	47	43
Non-white	30	44	30
Overall	45	46	41

Those respondents claiming awareness of the combat arms bonus were asked which services they could obtain it from. The results of this inquiry in each of the surveys were disappointing. Four percent correctly identified the Army and Marine Corps as the only services. In November 1973, 31% thought the bonus was offered by all services including the Coast Guard. While most of the respondents chose the Army, more attributed the bonus to the Navy and Air Force rather than the Marine Corps. In view of these results, more detailed analyses dealing with the bonus requirements were not attempted.

VI. SERVICE IMAGES

In each survey the respondents were asked to choose which of the military services was best described by a list of nine statements dealing with various positive characteristics of military life. Results from this series of questions have previously shown little meaningful variation across surveys.¹ The November 1973 data followed the same pattern. In general, the Air Force was most often mentioned as best in pay, family living conditions, chance to get ahead in a career, chance to learn new and useful skills, and chance to use one's skills and abilities. The Navy ranked above the other services in foreign travel opportunity and exciting life. The Marine Corps had the best image with regard to proving manhood and having the most attractive uniform.

A desire to compare service images held by those intending to enlist with those not planning to join the Regular Force and the inter-survey consistency of results led to the data presented in Figures VI-1 and VI-2. These figures represent unweighted responses aggregated across the six Gilbert Youth surveys. The percent of respondents choosing the Coast Guard as best on each statement was minimal and, therefore, is not included. It will be noted that the service most often cited as best described by each of the statements is exactly the same for youth regardless of their enlistment intent. The major difference in the distributions is that those not planning on enlisting were more likely to choose the no difference responses while those who planned to enlist tended to differentiate between the services.

A final service image question required the interviewees to name the best overall service. In view of the popularity of the Air Force on the individual image statements, the findings presented in Figure VI-3 are not surprising. In each survey the Air Force received the most support as the best service (30% in November 1973), followed by the Navy (24% in November 1973).

To arrive at a practical understanding of service images, the overall image data were compared with the responses to a more concrete question. Those respondents indicating that they would definitely or probably enlist as a Regular were asked which service would be their first choice. The results of this question (Figure VI-4) are at some variance with the item asking for the best overall service. On the image question the Army consistently ranked at the level of the Marine Corps; however, when asked what service they intended to join, the respondents more frequently selected the Army, generally below but near the Air Force

¹ Fisher and DiSario, *op. cit.*, Appendix E.




Figure VI 1. Image of Services Among Youth Who Plan to Enlist




Figure VI-2. Image of Services Among Youth Who Do Not Plan to Enlist




Figure VI-3. Overall Service Ratings

and Navy. Also unlike the Air Force ranking ahead of the Navy on the image question in each survey, the Navy was selected more frequently than the Air Force as a first choice in four of the six Gilbert surveys. In November 1973 the Navy was chosen by 32% of those with positive enlistment intent, while 30% listed the Air Force.

Although a direct comparison between service image findings and Reserve and National Guard branch preferences is not possible, the potential carry-over in image from the Regular to the Reserve Forces warrants study. Table VI-1 presents the branch-of-service preferences for individuals indicating positive intent toward the Reserves or National Guard. In November 1973 the Army National Guard and Reserve drew 27% of the responses, followed closely by the combined Air Force National Guard and Reserve branches with 25%. The Navy (with only one branch) was listed as the first choice by 22%.

These findings indicate that although the Air Force and Navy have a considerably better image among the general population of male youth, a comparable percentage of those with positive enlistment intent expect to join both the Regular and Reserve branches of the Army.




Figure VI-4. Service Given as First Choice by Respondents With Positive Enlistment

Table VI-1

Branch of Reserves of National Guard Given as First Choice by Respondents Definitely or Probably Joining

Service	May 71	Nov 71	May 72	Nov 72	May 73	Nov 73
Army National Guard	15	12	8	11	16	17
Army Reserve	10	9	6	15	13	10
Navy Reserve	14	18	25	25	17	22
Air Force National Guard	8	13	10	10	10	10
Air Force Reserve	16	21	20	17	21	15
Marine Corps Reserve	8	9	7	5	7	7
Coast Guard Reserve	4	8	10	6	8	9
Undecided	25	10	14	11	8	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

VII. RECRUITING

The final major area in which data have been collected in the Gilbert surveys involves sources of information about the military. This chapter will present findings relating to recruiter contact, receipt of recruiting literature in the mail, and alternative sources of information.

Respondents in each survey were asked whether they had ever come in contact with a military recruiter (contact was defined as being either personal or as part of a group). The percent of youth responding affirmatively to this question has ranged from 45% in November 1971 to 52% in May and November 1973. The percent of youth reporting contact with recruiters from the four major services in each survey is indicated in Figure VII-1. The rank ordering of recruiter contact has been identical across the six surveys with the Army having the most (31% in November 1973) followed by the Navy (22% in November 1973) and then the Air Force and Marine Corps (17% and 14% in November 1973).

In order to determine whether the recruiters from each service were concentrating on the population subgroups that had previously been identified as having high enlistment potential (Table II-2 and Figure II-2), subgroup analyses were performed on the data from the most recent survey. Table VII-1 presents the results. For the Army, highest levels of contact were found with groups having the lowest enlistment intent rates—high school graduates, 44% and youth out of school with more than a high school education, 45%. Highest levels of contact with Navy recruiters were also reported by these two groups. Air Force recruiters had the most contact with college students (23%). None of the subgroups had significantly more contact with Marine Corps recruiters than the overall rate of 14%.

These findings do not necessarily indicate a misallocation of recruiter resources because it is not known who initiated the contact, or if it indeed took place while the respondent was actually a member of the population subgroup to which he was assigned at the time of the survey. Racial differences in each service indicated relatively more contact with white than non-white youth, with the largest discrepancy occurring in the Navy.

In addition to ascertaining whether a respondent had contact with military recruiters, the Gilbert surveys have probed youths' reaction to the recruiter. A recruiter is the most direct link a particular service has with the pool of potential applicants. If negative opinions are formed of the recruiter, they may be generalized to that service as a whole.

Each respondent who reported contact with a recruiter was asked for his opinion of the recruiter. Comments were coded to reflect positive, neutral, and negative reactions to




Figure VII-1. Percent of Youth Reporting Contact With Military Recruiters

the recruiter. Data from the six surveys were consistent and analyzed in combined form for purposes of exposition. Table VII-2 presents subgroup analyses of the reactions of the various demographic subpopulations to the recruiter that they have been in contact with. A total of 40% of those having contact with Army recruiters expressed a favorable opinion towards them. The only group deviating significantly from this overall rate were the continuing high school seniors, 45% of whom expressed favorable opinions. High school underclassmen were the group most impressed with Navy recruiters (55%). None of the educational subgroups deviated significantly from the 48% overall positive response rate established by the Air Force recruiters. Marine Corps recruiters made the best impression on high school underclassmen (46%) while being rated favorably by only 28% of the non-continuing high school seniors.

Of the racial differences presented in Table VII-2 only the difference found in the Navy is large enough to be regarded as significant. A comparison among services on the overall rates of positive youth reactions shows the Air Force (48%) and Navy (47%) ahead of the Army (40%) and Marine Corps (38%).

Table VII-1

Subgroup Analysis of Recruiter Contact (Percent)*(Base: November 1973)*

<u>Group</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>
Educational Level				
H.S. Dropouts	28	16	14	15
H.S. Graduates	44	30	19	18
Post H.S. Education	45	32	21	19
H.S. Underclassmen	17	13	12	8
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	30	21	15	13
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	15	12	10	6
College Students	36	27	23	19
Race				
White	32	24	18	15
Non-white	23	11	16	10
Overall	31	22	17	14

Table VII-2

Percent Holding Favorable Opinion of Military Recruiters*(Base: Respondents who had been in contact with a military recruiter)*

<u>Group</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>
Educational Level				
H.S. Dropouts	40	48	43	43
H.S. Graduates	40	47	48	40
Post H.S. Education	40	46	46	38
H.S. Underclassmen	38	55	51	46
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	39	46	50	28
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	45	50	51	40
College Students	37	46	48	36
Race				
White	40	48	48	38
Non-white	43	42	48	35
Overall	40	47	48	38

Recruiting literature represents a second major method of communication with youth. Respondents in each survey were asked whether they had received recruiting literature in the mail. The percent of interviewees indicating receipt of such information ranged from 55% in May 1971 to 60% in May 1973. Figure VII-2 indicates the extent of use made by each service of this recruiting technique. In each survey the Army was most often cited as a source of recruiting literature (47% in November 1973), followed by the Navy (37% in November 1973). The Air Force ranked third each time (32% in November 1973), followed by the Marine Corps and Coast Guard (27% and 16% in November 1973).




Figure VII-2. Percent of Youth Reporting Receipt of Recruiting Literature

As with recruiter contact, subgroup analyses were performed on the recruiting literature data obtained in the most recent survey. Results are shown in Table VII-3 where significant differences among groups are apparent. In each service high school underclassmen report the lowest level of recruiting literature receipt, followed by the two high school senior groups and the high school dropouts. The other three subgroups indicate a much higher level of receiving such information. The current finding is probably caused by the relatively younger age of respondents in these two groups compared to the remainder of the population. Their lack of exposure to recruiting information may be due to the relatively short time they have actually been elements of the target youth population. The findings with regard to race in Table VII-3 were also consistent across all five services. White respondents reported greater rates of receipt of recruiting literature than non-whites.

Table VII-3

**Percent of Youth in November 1973 Reporting Receipt of
Recruiting Literature, by Service**

<u>Group</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Coast Guard</u>
Educational Level					
H.S. Dropouts	37	25	22	17	9
H.S. Graduates	60	47	37	32	19
Post H.S. Education	65	49	44	38	21
H.S. Underclassmen	15	9	7	6	4
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	34	22	19	22	11
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	30	16	17	12	10
College Students	69	63	57	47	29
Race					
White	49	39	34	28	17
Non-white	29	22	23	21	10
Overall	47	37	32	27	16

The last aspect of recruiting to be reported on here involves alternative sources of recruiting information. Figure VII-3 shows these sources to be decreasing in their exposure to youth since the initial Gilbert survey in May 1971. Respondents were asked whether they had seen or heard recruiting information on television, in posters, magazines and newspapers, on radio, or in literature (other than mail). In November 1973, 64% listed television as a source of recruiting information followed by posters, 51% and magazines and newspapers, 47%. Radio was cited by 34% and non-mail literature by 17%.




Figure VII-3. Percent of Youth Reporting Exposure to Alternative Sources of Recruiting Information

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

The youth surveys described in this report represent a valuable data resource to military planners. The scope and recurrence of the surveys contribute to their potential value. The methodology used enabled in-depth probing of many important topics. Periodic administration allowed for trend observation. The approach of the all-volunteer force, the withdrawal from hostilities, pay increases, and implementation of enlistment bonuses all occurred during the two and one-half year period covered by this report. Some findings shifted across time, while many others remained stable.

The current Gilbert Youth Studies are the second major research effort attempting to develop an understanding for the factors involved in the decision to enter military service. The earlier project¹ was a four-year longitudinal study conducted during the late sixties of over two thousand male youths, which followed the individuals from tenth grade until one year after high school graduation. Many of the results from this study have been supported by the Gilbert survey findings.

The data regarding enlistment intent, if carefully interpreted, can be used to estimate future input into the military services. Results from the Gilbert surveys, when evaluated in light of other significant factors such as the current rate of applicant rejections by the services, should provide answers to questions regarding the near-term feasibility of the all-volunteer force.

The information collected on incentives should be studied by those responsible for modifications in the benefits that military personnel receive. This will help ensure that such changes will have maximum effect on attracting people to and keeping them in the military.

Military planners and those responsible for the service's advertising campaigns should find the Gilbert data on enlistment deterrents and knowledge about the military useful. The services should strive to refute those deterrents cited by youth which are not consistent with the realities of military life. An awareness of the aspects of the military about which youth are either not knowledgeable or are misinformed is necessary for effective evaluation of previous advertising and indications of directions for future campaigns.

¹ *Youth in Transition, Volume V: Young Men in Military Service*, ISR Code No. 3434, Survey Research Center, Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

The service image and recruiting chapters provide feedback to the services on their relative standing among youth. Awareness of such information is critical for the services as they compete to recruit their share of the potential applicant pool.

In view of the fact that this report on the first six surveys does not represent the termination of the overall effort, it would seem appropriate to indicate suggestions for modifications in future Gilbert Youth surveys. The following comments are based on the experiences encountered in analyses of the surveys already administered.

A major need at the present time is to determine the optimal definition and number of population subgroups of interest. Previous reports have used a three-group analyses composed of youth in high school, in college, and out of school. The current analyses are based on an expanded seven-group division of the male youth population. It would be advantageous for those involved in the conduct of the survey to know the most useful conception of the population prior to the survey administration so that the sampling plan could be designed to obtain satisfactory reliability from each subgroup.

One related concern deals with the sampling of racial minority group members. Random sampling in the first six Gilbert surveys has failed to produce a sufficient sample size of non-whites to meet standard reliability criteria. If the overall sample size is not increased to the point at which a reliable number of minority group members are included, it is recommended that non-whites be oversampled.

With the increasing interest shown by the military in substantially raising the number of women in each service, it is suggested either that women be included in the current Gilbert survey format or that a new survey be developed specifically for women.

In some instances analyses of various items have resulted in the desire to probe more deeply into a specific topic, for example, items on recruiter contact. The development of information on occurrence of contact, service involved, nature of contact, and opinion of recruiters has raised questions about the circumstances under which the contact occurred and its perceived effect on enlistment intent. It is suggested that analysts communicate their desires for additional items to those responsible for the survey content.

The Gilbert survey, in its present form, is too long. Many of the current items are obsolete (e.g., draft-related questions) and could be deleted. Furthermore, the consistency of many items across time argues strongly for their inclusion on a periodic basis only.

Appendix A

MAXIMUM SAMPLING ERROR AT THE 95% CONFIDENCE LEVEL

(Reliability of Tabled Percentages $\pm X\%$)

<u>Group</u>	<u>May 71</u>	<u>Nov 71</u>	<u>May 72</u>	<u>Nov 72</u>	<u>May 73</u>	<u>Nov 73</u>
Educational Level						
H.S. Dropouts	8	10	10	9	11	10
H.S. Graduates	6	7	6	7	7	6
Post H.S. Education	7	18	8	9	7	8
H.S. Underclassmen	5	5	4	6	4	5
H.S. Seniors (not continuing)	9	7	9	8	8	8
H.S. Seniors (continuing)	5	5	7	7	7	6
College Students	3	4	4	4	5	4
Race						
White	2	2	2	2	2	2
Non-white	7	8	8	6	7	6

